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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DEPUTY SHERIFFS MUTUAL AID ASSO-
CIATION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
Utah nonprofit Corporation, and PARLEY 
W. BLIGHT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS_ 
MERIT SYSTEM COMMISSION and 
FRANK W. PENNOCK, JOSEPH MAZU-
RAN and LESLIE B. WHITE, M.D., mem-
bers of the said Commission, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11856 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Nature of the Case 
By this action the respondents as plaintiffs in 
the Court below sought a declaratory judgment de-
termining that the eligible and promotional registers 
containing the names of persons eligible for ap-
pointment as deputy sheriffs or for promotion 
within the Sheriff's Department are public docu-
2 
ments within the meaning of Section 78-26-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 and are therefore subject to 
public inspection. The action also sought an order 
compelling the defendants to make these registers 
available for inspection because they had refused 
upon proper request to permit inspection of the 
registers. 
Disposition of the Case in the Lower Court 
It is correct, as stated by appellants, that Judge 
Faux, presiding on the law and motion calendar in 
the Court below, denied a motion for judgment on 
' the pleadings but appellants are in error when they 
state that it was Judge Faux's "view" that the reg· 
isters are not public documents. Judge Faux did not 
make such a determination and there is no such 
indication in the record. Judge Faux merely ruled 
that he was not prepared to rule on the basis of thG 
record before him that the requested order should 
be issued. It seems only fair in light of appellants 
attempted effort to establish a conflict between 
lower court judges, to state that Judge Faux, at the 
conclusion of the hearing, specifically stated that his 
denial of the motion was without prejudice to full 
consideration of the issues by the trial judge. Thus, 
when respondents describe the "relief sought on 
appeal" to be clarification of inconsistent rulings, 
they are not properly characterizing this proceed· 
ing. Judge Faux's denial of a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings is not before the Court and only 
Judge Anderson's action in declaring the registers 
to be public documents and ordering that they be 
3 
made available for inspection is the matter in issue 
and appellants seek a reversal of this. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants have referred only to the Re-
sponse to Requests for Admissions as the only facts. 
Pleadings, likewise, establish facts. Also, for the 
convenience of those referring to the briefs a short 
statement of facts will be set forth here: 
The Deputy Sheriffs - Merit System Act was 
adopted November 8, 1960 as an initiative measure, 
Chapter 30, Title 17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Pur-
suant thereto the Merit System Commission was 
established shortly thereafter. 
The statute requires the Commission to conduct 
open competitive examinations to determine the 
qualifications of applicants for positions as peace 
officers [ § 17-30-6] and for promotion of peace of-
licers within the Sheriff's Department [ § 17-30-12 (2)] 
and further requires that the Commission prepare 
and maintain an "eligible register" of persons PdSS-
inq the application examination [§ 17-30-9] and a 
"promotional register" [§ 17-30-12 (3)]. 
The members of the Commission promulgated 
its original Rules and Regulations which included a p10-
V]sion that the "eligible lists" (meaning the eligible 
and promotional registers required by the statute) 
"shall include the names and final scores of all those 
who passed the examinations and shall be open to 
all interested parties." Rules and Regulations for the Merit 
4 
Sr rvice Comllli.1sion for Salt Lake County Deputy Sherif ii 
published September 1, 1961. Subsequently, afier 
appointment of a new chairman, new rules were 
adopted in July, 1967. Rules and Regulations of Salt 
County Merit Servi.ce Commission Adopted July 27, 1967.1 
The new Rules alld Regulations make no provisions !Gr 
inspection of the eligible and promotional registers 
and the current Commission has refused to let the 
individual plaintiff, representatives of the plaintif! 
Mutual Aid Association, or members of the public 
mspect the registers. (Paragraph 3 of complaint her0-
iE and paragraph 3 of answer, R. pp. 2 & 5.) 
The plaintiffs in this action made the requisite 
demand to inspect these registers, but were refused 
access to them. (Complaint paragraph 5, answer 
paragraph 4; Answer to Requests for Admission; R. 
pp. 2, 5, 15.) Thereafter the complaint was filed sei:k-
ing declaratory relief and issuance of a writ of man-
da.m us or other appropriate writ compelling de-
fendants to permit inspection and copying of the 
n:::gisters (R. pp. 1-4). Plaintiffs' motion for judgment 
or: the pleadings was denied by the 
Merrill C. Faux presiding on the law and mohon 
cdendar (R. p. 19) and the case was placed on the 
trwi calendar and tried before the Honorable Aldon 
T. Anderson. Judgment was entered for the plam-
lit should be noted that although the title of new Rules 
Regul(ffions would lead one to believe that they arplY. to/ c: 
entire Salt Lake County employee system, they are m :i, 
a:iplicable oniy to the Deputy Shel'iffs and wel'e adopted by · h 
Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission pur:"uant to Chap-
30, Title 17, Utah Cnde Annotated, 1953. 
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tiffs (R. pp. 22-23) and a writ of mandamus issued 
:r, :Jp. 24-25). 
Defendants then obtained an order staying all 
supplemental proceedings, quashing the writ of 
mandamus, and ordering that the registers be kspt 
'.mcler seal by the Clerk of the Court pending ap-
peJ] by defendants. Thereafter, because of circum-
sL;nces arising as explained in the affidavit of 
D2puty Dale K. Gates, reprinted in the appendix 
to this Brief, plaintiffs moved that the promotional 
be immediately published and made avctil-
for inspection. That motion was heard on No-
·.rember 17, 1969, and it was upon suggestion of t}:e 
:ourt stipulated by counsel that the motion could 
be disposed of by the Court revealing to counsel 
" .. the promotional registers heretofore filed with 
Court and that upon such inspection and upon 
jp;:iortunity to counsel for plaintiffs to examine the 
;I of na.mes submitted by the Merit System Com-
:<iission to the Sheriff of Salt Lake County the moLon 
be dismissed ... " (Order of Judge Anderson 
rmlered November 19, 1969.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE ELIGIBLE AND PROMOTIONAL REG-
ISTERS MAINTAINED BY THE MERIT 
SYSTEM COMMISSION ARE PUBLIC DOCU-
MENTS AND BY STATUTES OF THIS 
ST A TE APPELLANTS ARE REQUIRED TO 
6 
PERMIT THEIR INSPECTION BY INTER-
ESTED CITIZENS. 
This entire case is premised on the broad base 
that the public's business, conducted by the public's 
servants, should be revealed to the public and Uwt 
suspicion, corruption, and inefficient administration 
of public business can be avoided by makmg oft-
cial acts open to public scrutiny. It must be noted 
at the threshold, however, that no charges of cor-
ruption are made in this case. There is in this ca3e 
no allegation that the defendants have falsified the 
registers or been guilty of any improper conduct, 
other than refusal to permit inspection of the reg:s-
ters. This is not to say, however, that such refu3a.J 
does not create suspicion, engender a lack of confi· 
dence in the merit system, and lead to confusie:n 
and misunderstanding and in other circumstanc6s 
may well lead to an opportunity for corruption. 
This fundamental premise of the public's right 
to know has been for many years recognized by the 
statutes of this State. The Utah Code states clearly 
and simply: 
"Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a 
copy of any public writing of this state except 
as otherwise expressly provided by statute." and 
"Every public officer having the custody of a 
public writing which a citizen has the right to 
inspect is bound to give him, on demand, a certi-
fied copy of it, on payment of the legal fees 
7 
therefor¢." §§ 78-26-2, 3, Utah Code Annotated, 
19 5 3. 
"Public writings" are defined to include "other 
official documents." § 78-26-1 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. Appellants concede that the eligible and pro-
motional registers are public documents which they 
a.re required by statute to maintain. It is generally 
conceded that under statutes such as this if a record 
is required to be kept, either by statute or by some 
other proper authority, it is a public record. See 
Conover v. Board of Education of Nebo School District, 
1Ut.2d375,267 P.2d 768, 770 (1954); Kyburgv.Perkins,6 
Cal 674 (1856); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 
2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (1957). Thus, appellants may 
refuse inspection only if such refusal is "otherwise 
expressly provided by statute." § 78-36-2, Utah Coc:ie 
Annotated, 1953, (emphasis added.) 
There is no provision in the Utah Code, as thern 
was in the California Code in the sole case relied 
upon by appellants, that provides that communica-
tions made to a public official which would other-
wise be subject to inspection may be withheld if 
the communications were made to the official "in of-
ficial confidence when the public interest would 
suffer by the disclosure." City and County of San Fran-
cisco i. SujJcrior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156, 238 P.2d 581 0951). 
The California statutory provisions are otherwise 
similar to those of Utah and the omission of this pro-
vision by Utah is significant. Appellants here can 
cite no Utah statutory authority whatsoever even 
lhough the controlling statute requires an express ex-
ception to its mandate. 
8 
The California decision relied upon by appeJ. 
lants is further distinguished upon the ground that 
the information there had been given to the public 
body on a promise of confidentiality that the in-
formation would not be disclosed (thus placing 
situation clearly within the quoted California statu-
tory exception.) But, here, there is no attempt to oi::-
tam any confidential information. We seek only the 
opportunity to examine a list of names declared by 
the Merit System Commission to be eligible for ap-
pointment or promotion as deputy sheriffs. When 
applying for a competitive appointment or promo-
tion a candidate obviously knows that he will be 
ranked on the register in order of the merits of his 
qualifications-in the case of the promotional reg--
isters, as conceded by appellants, these qualifica-
tions are determined in part by other factors in addi-
tion to the written score. It is almost absurd to sug-
gest any necessity for keeping the lists confidential 
or that a candidate would expect such secrecy. 
There is no statutory exception 
permitting concealment of the registers 
The appellants seek to support their refusal 
to make these lists available by reliance upon that 
portion of the Merit System Act which provides that 
"examination papers shall not be open to public in· 
spection without court order." The entire secti0n 
pertaining to examination papers reads: 
"All examination papers shall remain the prop-
erty of the commission, and shall be preserved 
9 
until the expiration of the eligible register for the 
preparation of which an examination is given. 
Examination papers shall not be open to public 
inspection without court order, but an applicant 
may inspect his own papers at any time within 
thirty days after the mailing of notice of his 
grade. The appointing authority may inspect the 
papers of an eligible applicant certified for ap-
pointment." 
§ 17-30-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
This is obviously referring to the papers of the written 
competitive examination required by an earlier sec-
tion [ 17-30-6] pertaining to applicants for initial ap-
poin tment as deputy sheriffs and not to the promo-
tional examination required by a later section [17-
30-12] for establishment of the promotional registers. 
But even if it is interpreted to also apply to the 
promotional examination papers, that is irrelevar:t, 
because no one is here seeking revelation of any 
"examination papers." We do seek, however, m-
spection of the "eligible register" and the "promo-
tional register" provided for by Sections 17-30-9 and 
17-30-12, respectively. There is no statement in the 
statute that the registers are not open to public inspec-
tion. Appellants infer such requirement from the re-
quirement that an individual's examination papers not 
be revealed. Appellants' very argument admits th3 
errOi of their position. The statute requires an express 
exception, but appellants' attempt to meet this re-
quirement by an inferred exception and that sug-
gested inference is one that is, at best, strained The 
case;:; interpreting the word "express" are legion. 
It is defined as that which is "given in direct terms; 
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not implied; not dubious; directly stated; not implied 
or left to inference; ... " State v. Zangerle, 101 Ohw 
235, 128 N.E. 165, 167 (1920). See also, Le Ballister v. 
Redwood Theatres, 1 C.A. 2d 447, 36 P.2d 827 (19341; 
R. J. Card."nal Co. u. Ritchie, 218 C.A. 2d 124, 32 CoJ 
Reptr. 545, 552 (1963); Hawkins v. Mattes, 171 Okl. 186, 
41P.2d880, 891 (1935); McKeever v. Oregon Mortgage Co., 
60 Mont. 270, 198 P. 752, 753 (1921); St. Louis Union 
Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W. 2d 685, 689 (1%4); 
Baxter l'. Baxter, 195 N.E. 2d 877, 882 (Ind. App. 1964;; 
Application of Lamb, 67 N.J. Super. 39, 169 A.2d 822, 
826, affd., 34 N.J. 448, 170 A.2d 34 (1961). 
Appellants argue that because the test papers 
are not to be revealed then neither can the score 
be revealed and because the score cannot be re· 
vealed then neither can the register be revealed 
because, although the register would not even re-
veal the score it would reveal the relatiiiG 
position of each man on the list. But that is not wl1at 
the statute says. In the first place, the statute does 
not prohibit revelation of the score or the results 
of the examination; but not even this second sl8P 
in appellants' tortfous argument is involved here. 
The statute's exception to the fundamental rule re-
quirmg that public papers be open for inspectiun 
is express and narrow and refers only to the w1it· 
ten exa.mination papers. The same section of the 
statute which provides that examination papers shall 
not be open to public inspection imposes no such 
restriction when speaking about the registers. Had 
it been intended that the registers should also not 
be oade public the words for so stating were mani-
11 
lest in this statute itself but were specifically and 
knowingly omitted when speaking about the reg-
!::ters. 
Appellants are seeking to construe a statute 
that is clear and unambiguous. Where the language 
of a sta.tute is plain and unambiguous there is no 
occasion to resort to rules of construction. 50 Am. ]ur. 
S!atutcs, § 225. But if the rules of construction are to 
be resorted to, those rules clearly dictate that the 
registers shall be open for inspection. 
The Commission by prior interpretation of the 
statute expressly permitted inspection 
It is significant that even the Merit System Com-
mission itself, of which two of the present commis-
sioners were members, prior to the appointment of 
its present chairman and revision of its Rules and Reg-
ulations in July, 1967, provided in its Rules and Regula-
tions published September 1, 1961 that the registers 
would be open for inspection by all interested 
parties. The earlier Rules and Regulations referred 
to the registers as "Eligible Lists" and Rule 4 in perti-
nent part read: 
"4.01 Lists Required. 
A register of eligibles shall be prepared and 
maintained by the Commission for all openings 
and promotions for Deputy Sheriffs. 
"4.02 Order of Priority. 
The names of applicants shall be entered 
upon the eligible list in accordance with their 
12 
standing in the examinations, including credit 
for leadership, merit rating, seniority, character, 
and demeanor when applicable and said eligible 
lists shall include the names and final scores of 
all those who passed the examinations and shall 
be open to all interested parties, at the office of 
the Commission." 
(Rules and Regulations for the Merit Service 
Commission for Salt Lake County Deputy 
Sheriffs, published September 1, 1961) 
Thus, the statement in appellants' brief (page 13) 
that they "in the past have refused" to make the reg-
isters public and "have felt it incumbent as a duty 
upon them to keep the registers as well as the e\· 
amination scores confidential" is just not the fact. 2 
It is a fundamental rule that in determining the 
meaning and defining the effect of particular words 
and phrases in statutes, ordinances, and regulations 
a practical construction by the officers charged w1'h 
enforcing the matter being construed is given gr&at 
weight. See 37 Am. fur. Municipal Corporations § 187; 50 
Am. fur. Statutes § 319. This is especially so where tre 
statute, ordinance, or regulation is ambiguous. At 
2The prior Rules and Regulations were not made part of the 
record in this proceeding but it is anticipated that appellaniJ 
will not object to this reference. In any event, the Court shou. 
be able to take judicial notice of printed regulations o! th1: 
public body. See McCormack, Handbook of Law of Ev.idenc< 
(1954) pp. 695-6 and Final Draft of the Rules ?f Ev1denfe; 
prepared by Supreme Court Committee on Um form Rue; 
of Evidence (1959), Rules 9 and 12. In the alternative, it 1• 
respectfully requested that this be treated as a request '.01 
modification of the record pursuant to Rule 75(b), Utah RuJes 
of Civil Procedure, and that the Rules and Regulations be m· 
corpora ':ed as part of the record. 
13 
best all that appellants' argument does is introduce 
an ambiguity which should be resolved by the long 
interpretation obviously placed on the statute by 
the prior members of the Commission, including two 
of its present members, before appointment of its 
present chairman. 
The plain meaning of the statute is clear. The 
obligation of the Court in interpreting and constru-
ing statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention 
of the legislature. In doing so, the Court may not 
read into the statute, as appellants are asking it to 
do, anything which is not the manifest intention of 
those enacting the statute as gathered from the act 
itself; statutes should not be construed any more 
broadly than their terms require. The Court may not 
infer that which is not intended to be there. 50 Am. 
fur. Statutes §§ 223, 229, 243. As previously stated l::y 
this Court: 
The language of the statute, as it seems to us, is 
plain and its meaning clear, in which case there 
is no room for construction or license to search 
for its meaning beyond the statute itself and 
requires the application of the familiar maxim, 
that a thing expressed puts an end to implica-
tion ( 2 5 R.C.L. 9 5 8) , and that no motive, pur-
pose, or intent can be imputed to the Legislature 
in the enactment of a law other than such as are 
apparent upon the face and to be gathered from 
the terms of the law itself. 
Riches v. Hadlock, 80 Ut. 265, 15 P.2d 238 
at 296 (1932). 
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POINT TWO 
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES PUBLICATION 
OF THE ELIGIBLE AND PROMOTIONAL 
REGISTERS. 
There can be no quarrel with appellants' state-
ment that the purpose of the Merit System Act "is 
to require the hiring and promoting of officers in the 
sheriff's department on a basis of merit." This 1s 
amply manifest by the title to the Act, which reads: 
An act to establish the qualification, appoint-
ment, promotion, transfer, demotion, suspension, 
removal, discipline, re-employment and job 
tenure of deputy sheriffs of the several counties 
of the state of Utah based on merit; to provide 
for the establishment of merit system commis-
sions in the several counties and to set forth the 
duties thereof and to improve law enforcement 
by professionalizing those engaged in law en-
forcement as employees of the several counties. 
(See Annotators notes to Section 17-30-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953.) 
Respondents heartily subscribe to this statement of 
purpose and it is because of their strong belief in 
this Act and its purpose that this action is brought. 
The quarrel comes with the appellants' contentior1s 
that the single most important product of the statute 
is to be kept secret. Public policy, rather than per· 
mitlmg such secrecy as advocated by appellan's, 
cries for the publication of the eligible and promo· 
tional lists. 
15 
The appellants argue "that the registers in ques-
tion are not public documents open to the citizenry 
for inspection" because of the provisions of the 
Merit System Act and "its over-riding purpose being 
to remove from political patronage the appointment 
and promotion of deputy sheriffs." (Brief of Appel-
lants, p. 3.) It is obvious, however, that the Merit 
Syslem Commission may not be any more immune 
to the disease of political patronage than is th3 
Sheriff and his staff or any other administrator or 
commission. The public is interested in having its 
police officers hired and promoted. on the basis of 
mGriL. To accomplish this, the public has statutorily 
supplemented the Sheriff's subjective evaluation d 
h1s men with the objective evaluation of them 
1 through competitive examinations administered :Cy 
the Commission. The public has the right to scrutin-
ize the evaluation of the men by the Merit System 
Commission to insure that it remains objective and 
impartial. We may well ask, as the New York Court 
did in a proceeding before it: "Instead of resisting 
a request for light, the commissioners might rather 
be to welcome an opportunity to justi.fy 
their action; ... 'Why was preference thus given?' 
· .. it can be answered fully only by a disclosur:e 
of all the documents which were the basis of action." 
Egall v. Board of W'ater Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 
0912). Indeed the appellants appropriately cite at 
Page: 10 of their Brief the prior words of this Court: 
"It is one of the cardinal rules of construction 
that a statute must be construed with reference 
to the objects sought to be accomplished by it." 
16 
Conol'cr t'. Foard of Educdion of Nebo School 
Dist., 110 Ut. 454, 175 P.2d 209, 210 (1946) 
quoting from Crockett z;. Board of Education 
of Carbon Coz111ty, 58 Ut. 303, 199 P. 158, 159 
(1921). 
The appellants c::.ttempt to blunt the effect of their 
refus1l to permit inspection of the lists by sayiriy 
t:-iat the rules do permit an individual deputy to 
his papers (even this is required by 
statute) and to learn of his individual position on the 
rngister without learning who else is on the list ')f 
in what positions. That is little comfort if there is a 
suspicion that appointments or promotions of oth9rs 
ma_y not be in accord with the register, or that there 
may have been changes or amendments to the reg-
isters. A position on the register is a relative thinJ 
and it does 'rery little good to know only one's own 
position. In the past vigil =int efforts of some mem-
f---,Prs of the Sheriffs Mutual Aid Associahcn 
h::ve :rPsulted in errors on the lists being corrected 
by the Merit System Commission.3 Publication d 
the lists woul.d avoid some of these problems and, 
indeEd, may reveal more that are concealed by the 
refusal to make the lists public. 
3 For example, ,;ee affirl:ffit of Deputy Dale K. Gates "q>r!ntcJ 
in appendix hei·eto. It 1)e n0ted that the ;wohlel'1 
from the circurnst::ince b\· thP affidavit of Depuly Gutrs 
was in pert r.·•:n]vc>d b:,· th<' o!-rltT of Jmlg-p Amh;rson in tine 
c'.lsc, ent2red dt2r the had hem filed _inrl 
ment on a moticn of rcsponctents, e rnmrndwn °1 
a part of the J;:-;t l.J·,· i'c'sponclePts' courn,,'1. i, should <11_'0 'i' 
noted that c:as·c does nnt in anv wav involve <i clisru_r 
as to whii'.h Ji,·.•, of n?mes ;1wolvt'd 1n the Gall's ''itw1tion ;' 
That- i:-; a r:1?Uer t>nti, <'IY :-'•,'1;;nak frcm ; hisprol';'. 1'· 
in,..;. Apvtr2n'.l" _ thl' Slw1·iff usi,ng :t'l old list f''J\'en_ 11,1;1 
b'> the .. on '.JUt wlilch h:.cJ SUOi3E'flU2lJUy lxu1 <l'll• 1Jckl-. ' 
Moreover, the present Commission has super-
;mposed on the examination reouired by the stat-
ute, wrongfully it is believed and contrary to the 
cJ:press wording of the statute, what is described by 
lhe Commission as a "personal interview with the 
Commission wherein the applicant will be rated on 
p::rsonality and decorum, background and personal 
history information, etc." Rules and Regulations adopted 
luly 27, 1967-Rules 3.02(a) (4) and 3.02(b) (4). The 
statute, however, [§ 17-30-12 (2)] provides with 1e-
spect to promotional exams that the examination will 
consist of only three parts: the competitive examina.-
tion to test competency, the average of service rat-
ings (prepared by the Sheriff's Department) for the 
p::-sceding year, and a rating for seniority. Accord-
ing to the statute the combined weight of service 
rating and seniortiy is not to be more than 40% of 
the total score. But by the Commission Rule the in-
terview with the Commission is given a weight cf 
20% by appellants, outweighing even the deputy's 
service rating by his superiors (given a weight of 
15% by appellants) and the 5% weight given to sen-
iority! Rules and Regulations adopted July 27, 1967, R'..l.ie 
3.02(b) (4). The implication is obvious. Regardless of 
the objective scores on the written examination and 
the seniority and service ratings from the Sheriffs 
D2partment, the Commission has the opportunity 
through its own subjective determination to maLe-
riaJiy affect the position of a man on the register. 
Appellants contend that the statute has "built in 
it the opportunity for application to court for inspec-
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tion by any deputy or other party thought to be ag. 
grieved in the examination and register-composinJ 
process." (P. 7 of Appellants' Brief, emphasis added.) 
Lawsuits must be based on something firmer than 
a mere "thought" and without publication of the 
registers a deputy really does not, as a practical mat-
ter, know his true standing. The problem shown by 
the affidavit referred to above and reprinted in the 
u.ppsndix was easily brought to the Court's atten· 
hon on motion because this action, involving the 
very subject, was then pending. But deputies or 
other citizens cannot be expected nor required to 
bear the burden and expense of filing and prosecut· 
ing a lawsuit on every suspicion of irregularity in 
the promotional registers. Revelation of the registers 
would dispel much confusion and suspicion. 
Appellants assert as their "second agrument" 
(p. 11 Appellants' Brief) that if the registers are pub-
lished the Sheriff could "demand and receive not 
three names of the highest applicants as noted in 
the above section but the entire register" and could 
go shopping and "invent reasons" for passing over 
men to get to men lower on the register. This is a 
specious argument because the Sheriff could do so 
now if he chose to. It is a simple thing for the Sheriff 
to inquire of the man he wishes to appoint where l:e 
stands on the list. Appellants concede that each man 
is entitled to this information.4 In addition, the Com· 
4The promotions cannot be made until the Commission pray 
erly certified the three highest names at any given time, at 
though the entire list may be open for inspection, because a 
any given time there may be changes in the list by_ 
disqualifications, terminations, etc. and the Comm1ss1on mus 






mission's own regulations require the Sheriff to 
"submit in writing to the Commission his reasons 
for so refusing to appoint a certified candidate." 
Moreover, if the Sheriff passes over a man twice, a 
further explanation from the Sheriff is required an:l 
the appellants' present Rules and Regulations provic.e 
that: 
"In the event the Commission determines that 
said Sheriff's reasons are not justified, it shall 
so notify the Sheriff that no further lists of 
eligible candidates or applicants will be certified 
to the Sheriff, nor will any temporary appoint-
ments be approved by the Commission unless and 
until the nonappointed or overpassed candidate 
or applicant is, in fact, appointed or promoted." 
Rule 5.01 (b) ( c) Rules and Regulations 
of Salt Lake County Merit Service Commis-
sion adopted July 27, 1967. 
Thus, this supposed problem exists even without 
publication of the registers and, assuming the valid-
ity of this rule of the Commission, the problem 
raised is obviated by the rule. A more serfous prob-
lem is created by failure to publish the register. 
There is, as suggested above, no assurance that the 
Commisison has correctly certified the three highest 
if the register is not open for inspection. 
Appellants' final argument is that a merit system 
officer will hesitate to take an examination if his 
ultimate position on a promotional register were to 
20 
be revealed. By this argument we are now asked 
not to mollycoddle criminals but to mollycoddle 
police officers. Surely, mature police officers wb 
themselves have asked for and support this men\ 
system based on competitive examination are ns! 
afraid to take their position, openly and for all to see, 
on a promotional list. Moreover, each man takes the 
risk under the system that he may never be pru· 
moted: that is the clear implication of not only h:s 
comparative performance on the examination, bi;i 
of his over-all performance as a deputy sheriff. 
The arguments advanced for the cloak of secrc· 
cy are so weak and so out of harmony with the con· 
cept of the Merit System Act and the past regula· 
tions of the Commission itself that one wonders why. 
The words of this Cqurt in Conover v. Board of Educa· 
tion of Nebo School Dinrict, 1 Ut.2d 375, 267 P.2d 768at 
771 (1954) are here pertinent: 
"The truth about the official acts of public 
servants always should be displayed in the public 
market place, subject to public appraisal. Any at-
tempt to withhold information after a meeting, 
itself should be a subject for a wide publicity 
irrespective of the fact that withholding it might 
prevent someone's embarrassment because of in-
accuracy." 
CONCLUSION 
The express language of the pertinent statutGs 
and the policy underlying them sustain the action 
21 
of the triat court and the judgment should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
Gardiner & Johnson 
1320 Continental Bank Bldg. 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNC! 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPUTY SHERIFFS MUTUAL AID 
ASSOCIATION OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, ET AL., 
Plaintiffs, AFFIDAVIT OF 
vs. DALE K. GATES 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DEPUTY Civil No. 187169 
SHERIFFS MERIT SYSTEM COM-
MISSION, ET AL., 
Def end ants. 
State of Utah 
County of Salt Lake 
DALE K. GATES, being first duly sworn on oafo 
deposes and says: 
I am a first grade deputy assigned to the deter:-
tive division in the Salt Lake County Sheriffs De-
partment. On or about Tuesday, November 4, 19E9, 
Captain N. D. Hayward advised me that the sheriff 
had determined to promote some new sergeants. He 
also advised that the sheriff had reviewed the cur-
rent promotional register previously submitted to 
him by the Merit System Commission and that 
Deputy John Barnardo and I were in such posit1Gn 
on the promotional register that we would be among 
the first grade deputies to be promoted. Deputy Ber-
nardo also serves in the detective division with me. 
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On Wednesday, November 12, 1969, Mrs. E'ltes, 
,he sheriff's secretary, called me and stated that I 
was to be in the sheriff's office Friddy 
r:i0rning, November 14, at 10:00 a.m. I asked what 
;t concerned and she said, "It is not bad news; it is 
good news." I then inquired if it concerned the pro-
rnoticns and she said that I vrould have to come 
down and see but that it would be extremely good 
news. 
She also asked where she could contact John 
Bernardo so that the same invitation could be ex-
tended to him. I was asked to contact Deputy Ber-
nardo and give him the same information, wh1ch I 
did. Early Friday morning, November 14, 1969, 
Deputy Bernardo and I were called into the sheriffs 
ofhce. The sheriff stated to us that on Tuesday, No-
vember 11, he had telephoned Mr. Frank Pennock, 
chairman of the Merit System Commission, and ad-
vised Mr. Pennock that he would be appointing 
some new sergeants from the promotional register 
which he then had, and that he would appoint the 
men in order as they appeared on the register and 
would not jump over any man. The sheriff stated 
to us that Mr. Pennock advised that this was satis-
!ac\ory. In this meeting Deputy Bernardo and I were 
shown the promotional register that was in the 
sheriffs possession at the time of his determination 
lo make the promotions and at the time of his tele-
Phone conversation with Mr. Pennock. Deputy Ber-
nardo was fifth on the list and I was fourth. Also on 
the list ahead of our names were Deputies Carl 
Evans, John Malmborg and Mike Wilkerson, al-
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though we cannot recall specifically what order they 
were in. 
The sheriff then advised that at 4:30 on the after· 
noon of Thursday, November 13, Mr. Pennock had 
appeared at the sheriff's office and advised the 
sheriff that the promotional register that the shenif 
then had was not accurate and submitted to the 
sheriff six new names. The six names were not 
necessarily in order as follows: John Patience, Carl 
Evans, Mike Wilkerson, John Malmborg, Bruce 
Egan and Gary Anderson. Neither Deputy John Ber· 
nardo nor I was among the six names. We should 
also note that when obserivng the prior list we noted 
that Deputy Parley Blight was the sixth name fo]. 
lowing the name of Deputy Bernardo, and his name 
was not included among the six new names sub-
mitted to the sheriff. 
The sheriff then informed us that because :if 
this new list being given to him by the Merit Sys· 
tern Commission he could not give us the promo· 
tions to sergeant which he had intended to do. 
Dated: November 14, 1969. 
I sf Dale K. Gates 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of 
November, 1969. 
Is I Camille Kiger 
Notary Public 
